Tag Archives: law enforcement

The (Un)Importance of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism

The new set of reports under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania were published by the Commission. The mechanism is used by the Commission to monitor the progress of both countries in the fields of judicial reform, corruption and organised crime. But does the mechanism matter?

It’s difficult to say. The CVM was an instrument used to extend conditionality beyond the accession date for Bulgaria and Romania. For three years after the accession the EU could impose safeguard clauses, including a specific safeguard clause in the area of justice and home affairs (art. 36 of the Accession Treaty). However, this period has expired. It the strict sense of the word CVM is no longer a conditionality instrument. Eli Gateva has written a very good paper on this, explaining that the absence of accession rewards combined with toothless explicit threats for sanctioning non-compliance produce very weak negative incentive structure.

On the other hand both the Bulgarian and Romanian governments pay attention to the recommendations in the reports and at least try to act on them. One reason for this can be the difficulty of acceding to the Schengen area. Both France and Germany have linked the two issues, although they are not legally dependent. So one may argue that the accession to the Schengen area is now a new conditionality tool, used to push reforms of the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania.

There is also another interpretation – that “old” Member States have given up hope of achieving effective structural reforms of the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania, and are trying to mitigate the damage by denying access to the Schengen area. This strategy will fail. Neglecting the structural deficits of law enforcement and the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania can have wide-ranging implications for the whole European Union. It is not possible to “isolate” both countries in some sort of a triage. Their weaknesses impact negatively the overall security of the EU, and of the separate Member States.

That is why the CVM is still useful – at least as an instrument for diagnosis.



The Bulgarian Interface for Abuse of Human Rights

The Bulgarian Electronic Communications Act is about to be amended. The amendment will provide unlimited, direct access to the personal data of Bulgarian users of Internet and telecommunication services for the Ministry of Interior. This data will be supposedly used for investigating criminal activities and organized crime groups (OCGs).

On face value it would appear that this is a normal step in efforts to fight criminal activities that can otherwise benefit from the opportunities provided by the Internet and modern telecommunications. If one reads the motives of the Bulgarian government for the proposed amendment, one may as well say that there are enough procedural guarantees for the privacy of communications of Bulgarian citizens.

So why do I think this amendment is dangerous?

One reason only – institutional capacity. As we have seen during the last few years, both the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior and the State Agency “National Security” have misused their powers of access to special investigative techniques (SIT). In France, which has a population of nearly 60 million people, there are about 5 000 authorizations per year for the use of SIT, while in Bulgaria, with a population of 7.6 million, the authorizations are 10 000 per year. The collected data has “leaked” in numerous cases in the media. Many times the SITs have been used against political rivals or journalists.

The uncontrolled use of SITs threatens not only the human rights of individuals, but the political process as well. I should remind here that Bulgaria is still monitored under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism specifically due to the lack of institutional capacity of the law enforcement institutions.

Giving more powers to these institutions and the Ministry of the Interior in particular without a comprehensive reform will only exacerbate existing problems. I should probably remind the Government that even today the low-end corruption in the traffic police is still a major issue of huge proportions. How are we supposed to believe that our data are safe with the Ministry of Interior when we are witnessing acts of corruption on the streets every day?

The limitations of human rights are sometimes justified to maintain the public order. But the current approach (widespread use of SITs, higher sanctions for various crimes) is not functionally justified. It will not deliver measurable results and it will not improve the law enforcement success record.

The good news is that an impartial body – the European Commission, will continue to evaluate the Bulgarian efforts in fighting crime and may suggest corrections of policy should these be needed.