The “Fiscal Stability Union” in a Nutshell

The statement of eurozone leaders is scant on details. However, what we know is that:

• The golden fiscal stability rule that annual structural deficit should not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP will be enshrined in eurozone Member States constitutions or equivalent acts;
• There will be an automatic correction mechanism in national legislation that shall be triggered in the event of deviation;
• There will be common standards for the automatic correction mechanism and compliance with those standards will be monitored by the European Commission; the transposition of those standards will be subjected to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice;
• Eurozone Member states will have to report their national debt issuance plans;
• When a Member State breaches the 3% budget deficit ceiling there will be automatic consequences unless a qualified majority of Member States decides otherwise;
• Some of those measures will be pursued by more active use of enhanced cooperation.

Urgent Measures

The eurozone leaders have also agreed on a couple of urgent measures:

• The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) treaty will enter into force as soon as Member States representing 90 % of the capital commitments have ratified it, preferably by July 2012;
• Ensuring a combined effective lending capacity of EUR 500 billion by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and ESM;
• Provision of additional resources for the IMF of up to EUR 200 billion (USD 270 billion), in the form of bilateral loans;
• Unanimity for the ESM will be replaced by a qualified majority of 85 % in case the Commission and the ECB conclude that an urgent decision related to financial assistance is needed.

Legal Analysis of Proposals

Given the objection of the United Kingdom, and possibly Hungary, the revision of EU Treaties seems impossible at the moment. That is why the eurozone leaders speak about an “international agreement” that should be signed by March 2012. This agreement will not be part of EU law (at least initially). I fail to see, though, how can the European Commission participate in the monitoring of fiscal stability in this case. Enhanced cooperation (Art. 20 TEU and art. 329 TFEU) seems more appropriate. The problem there is that only the European Commission can propose an enhanced cooperation to the Council, and the European Parliament must also approve it. This can lead to substantial delays of the procedure. That is why a two-track strategy appears more appropriate. Common standards for fiscal stability should be specified in the “international” agreement. Together with it the eurozone member States should initiate an enhanced cooperation authorization procedure. That is important, because any credible fiscal stability regime will need to transfer monitoring powers to the European Commission. This means that the drafting of rules must start now, in close cooperation with the European Commission and the European Parliament.

The Toxic Role of the United Kingdom

For some time I have been quite skeptical of UK’s role in the European integration process. There are deep divisions within the British political establishment on UK’s place in the EU. However, those internal divisions are spilling over to the EU and creating instability. The truth is that there are too many UK politicians that want the UK out of the EU, and in the European Economic Area.

I fully support the right of UK to define its own place in the integration process. With its decision to object to the new eurozone governance rules, the UK is basically signaling its determination to distance itself further from core EU countries. However, I think that the UK must not be allowed to unilaterally obstruct the further building of the European project. That is why a new political dialogue must be started among EU Member States about the possible modifications of UK’s scope of membership and responsibilities in the EU. This process must reflect the UK’s concerns, as well as the strategic objectives of the Union. What is clear is that we cannot continue to pretend that the UK is on board in support of the integration process.

So I am more interested in the possible impact of the crisis on the future of the European Union. This may sound like an “unknown unknown”, but to my opinion trying to solve the eurozone crisis without taking into account the impact on the EU institutions and the integration project is useless. So let’s see what the options are.

1. Monetization of debt

The excessive debt of peripheral eurozone countries can simply be monetized by the ECB by using the proverbial printing press. The downsides are clear: the threat of moral hazard and inflation. Moral hazard means that once the ECB starts to monetize debts, every eurozone Member State can point to this precedent and demand equal treatment (i.e. more printing of euros to cover unsustainable debt). This leads to the second danger – elevated inflation, although some claim that this is not very likely due to the recession. If monetization happens, it will obviously be accompanied with a form of fiscal union, because there will have to be very strong guarantees against fiscal profligacy. In the short to medium term this approach can save the eurozone, and the European project as a whole. The problems with this approach are twofold: first, it may lead to unsustainable EU fiscal institutions if Germany and other northern Member States push too hard in their desire to guarantee fiscal discipline; second, in the long term this may also mean that peripheral Member States will become even more uncompetitive if again Germany and other northern Member States fail to reform their economies and stimulate internal demand.

In conclusion this approach may lead to long-term mutations that may transform the European Union into an undemocratic and unjust sovereign. On the good side, it saves us from immediate harm.

2. Credit crunch and disintegration of the eurozone

If the ECB does not monetize peripheral eurozone debt, then we may expect consecutive bank runs, asset sell-offs and overall economic misery in the eurozone periphery. This misery will probably be contagious, spilling over to the eurozone core, the US, Japan, China, and all over the world. Sooner, rather than later, the eurozone periphery will reintroduce capital controls and will effectively pull out of the eurozone. The economic and social consequences cannot be reliably foreseen, but will be very damaging to the global economy. Politically, the EU may disappear.

3. The way forward

It is quite obvious that the eurozone core must be convinced to monetize peripheral debt. This solution will be very difficult to achieve, but it serves all interests. However, it must be done carefully in order to protect the European project from excessive German influence that may in the long term transform the EU into some ugly mutant. The peer pressure of G20, and the US in particular, will be instrumental in achieving this difficult victory over petty short-term interests.

What all this reveals is a new incursion into political entrepreneurship, mainly by the leaders of France and Germany, to somehow solve this crisis. This is also a sign of failure of the European governance mechanism that simply does not withstand the political pressure.

The leaders of the main EU institutions play only supporting roles in this spectacle. The governments of the Member States, aided by the IMF, are once again trying to pull themselves by their own hair.

The crisis of European political leadership notwithstanding, we are experiencing the incapability of the institutional mechanism of the European Union to deliver in this difficult moment. Important decisions are taken outside the multilateral decision-making track. This brings more instability to the system and delegitimizes the decision taken. One of the reasons is the blatant disregard for European Union law.

During the dinner in Cannes Mrs. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy reportedly asked Mr. Papandreou whether Greece wants to stay in the eurozone or not. The problem of this question is that it has not been discussed with all 26 Member states other than Greece, and to my knowledge it would take all these 26 Member states AND Greece in order to decide on its exit from the eurozone. In other words the political entrepreneurship has neglected the very structure and substance of EU law, hiding behind the veil of urgency. Urgently taken decisions often are bad decisions, though. The European Union is much more than its currency and no economic crisis of any proportion should be used as a tool to destroy what has already been built.

While we, Europeans, remain surprisingly short-sighted, our American allies have already noticed and evaluated the huge importance of our weakness. Perhaps it is time to start thinking strategically and stop shooting in the dark.

When adopted, the legislation package will establish a common strategic framework for the ERDF, ESF, CF, the EAFRD and EMFF. A Partnership Contract will be agreed between the Commission and each EU Member State, bringing together all the country’s commitments to delivering European objectives and targets. Before funds are paid out, authorities will have to demonstrate that satisfactory strategic, regulatory and institutional frameworks are in place to ensure the funds are used effectively. The release of additional funds will be dependent on performance. Deficiencies in macroeconomic policy (excessive budget deficits, etc.) will lead to suspension of the cohesion financing. Procedures will be simplified and computerised where possible. Eligibility rules for EU funding instruments will be harmonised.

The idea is to tax a great number of financial instruments – including instruments which are negotiable on the capital market, money-market instruments (with the exception of instruments of payment), units or shares in collective investment undertakings (which include UCITS and alternative investment funds) and derivatives agreements. The tax rates will be set by Member States, but must not be less than 0.1% of the taxable amount in most cases.

According to the Commission the new tax will have progressive distributional effects, i.e. its impact will increase proportionately with income, as higher income groups benefit more from the services provided by the financial sector.

The proposed measures are a big step forward for the European border security policy. However, a few Member States have already expressed skepticism, citing the national sovereignty as the main reason. They seem to have forgotten the very poor response of France and Italy to the wave of sea-borne migrants due to the Arab Spring revolutions in North Africa.

It will be very interesting to observe the debate on the Commission proposals, since border security is one of the factors that will define the viability of the European project.

The last two decades were very good for you. You were able to unify your divided territory and your people. You had your fair deal of growth and expansion of trade. You began to “normalize”, as experts say.

Today you have to solve a great problem. It is up to you to decide whether the eurozone project lives or dies. I will not go into the details of the problem and the possible solutions. In any case you know very well what is at stake and what the options really are.

But why should you choose to save the euro? Well, two reasons spring to mind. First, a breakup of the eurozone will be very messy and will likely hurt your banks, pension funds and ultimately – your own citizens. The breakup will negate some of the important benefits of the internal European market and will cause widespread economic troubles around the whole world.

Second, killing the euro will go against your own obligations. When you founded the eurozone you also agreed that any amendment of the rules of the EMU will go through an amendment of the Treaties. That means that countries such as France and Belgium must explicitly agree to the eurozone breakup, and I sincerely doubt that they would. So in case you want to print Deutsche Marks again, you will have to infringe the Treaties in a very blatant way.

If the internal political pressure is really high you might probably risk and do it. But going against the founding principles of the European Union will have a very high price for you. One of the reasons for the unification back in 1990 was that you were securely integrated in the European Community. Yes, you are very different now and yes, you are rightly demanding a stronger voice in the world affairs. But still – there are ambiguous feelings in Europe about a strong and expansionistic German economy, especially if combined with a rapprochement with Russia. You need to think carefully about those considerations.

Whatever you decide to do, I would strongly advise talking sincerely with your own people. Cheap propaganda about the lazy Greeks may sell the newspapers, but we’re not talking about entertainment here. Your choices will define the future of all European citizens, and that means Germans as well. The European Union will never be the same after the breakup of the eurozone, and you will not enjoy the position that you have now.

Please think carefully before making your decision. The world will not end with the euro, but it will be an uglier place.

Best regards,

Vihar Georgiev

• Regular meetings of the eurozone heads of state and government twice a year;
• President of the eurozone coinciding with the president of the European Council;
• Reinforcing the powers of the eurogroup of finance ministers (whatever that means);
• All Member States of the euro area to incorporate a balanced budget fiscal rule into their national legislation by the summer of 2012;
• All Member States of the euro area should confirm without delay their resolve to swiftly implement the European recommendations for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms;
• Finalizing the negotiation on the Commission’s proposal on “a common consolidated corporate tax base” before the end of 2012;
• Macro-economic conditionality of the Cohesion fund should be extended to the structural funds;
• Joint Franco-German proposal on a Financial Transaction Tax by the end of September 2011.

So how to interpret this proposal? I will divide my analysis in two parts: 1. Efficiency to solve the urgent problems of the eurozone and 2. Long-term institutional considerations.

1. Efficiency to solve the urgent problems of the eurozone

This proposal will not solve the urgent problems of the eurozone. It is far from what is necessary to calm the markets and will not help neither the ECB, nor Italy and Spain. While Merkel and Sarkozy did touch upon the creation of a eurozone bond as a distant possibility, they did not make a positive step in this direction. This happens while many experts claim that only two options remain open – the creation of a eurozone bond or the breakup of the eurozone. I firmly believe that a eurozone breakup will be a huge blow to the whole world economy, and some research supports this view. That is why any further dodging of this issue will only add to the damage to the eurozone economy.

2. Long-term institutional considerations

Looking carefully at the Franco-German proposal, there is nothing really new that is being added to the Pact for the Euro. The common consolidated corporate tax base and the financial transaction tax (Tobin tax) are old ideas, and they are being drafted by the Commission. The “eurozone economic government” is nothing more than a high-level political meeting with unclear powers, but probably within the framework of the Euro Plus Pact. The “president” of the eurozone probably adds some weight to the position of the president of the European Council, but again his/her powers are not clearly defined and would probably only deal with coordination.

What is more troubling is the intrinsic logic of these proposals. They stay within the logic of intergovernmentalism, leaving all the important decisions to an intergovernmental body. This is a recipe for failure. It’s infuriating that after sixty years of supranational regulation we resort to an inefficient mechanism that remains prone to the joint-decision trap. We are curing the problem with more of the same, and this will lead to deepening of the problems. If we want to keep the eurozone intact we must give an independent body – the European Commission or another entity, the power to sanction Member States for their infringement of the budgetary discipline “golden rule”. Any other solution will not work precisely the way the current mechanism for ensuring budgetary stability in the eurozone does not work.

This intergovernmentalist trend must be stopped. Nobody believes that the Member States are able to control each other. If we want the integration process to continue, we need to take into account its inherent logic. Otherwise we will only breed hybrids that will live shortly and leave a mess behind.

Under the proposal, six countries would be asked to contribute less to projects that they currently co-finance with the European Union. The supplementary EU co financing is designated for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and Hungary.

The measure does not represent new or additional funding but it allows an earlier reimbursement of funds already committed under EU cohesion policy, rural development and fisheries. The EU contribution would be increased to a maximum of 95% if requested by a Member State concerned. This should be accompanied by a prioritisation of projects focusing on growth and employment, such as retraining workers, setting up business clusters or investing in transport infrastructure. In this way level of execution can be increased, absorption augmented and extra money injected into the economy faster.

It concerns Member States that have been most affected by the crisis and have received financial support under a programme from the Balance of Payments mechanism for countries not in the Euro area (Romania, Latvia and Hungary) or from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism for countries in the Euro area (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Bulgaria is not included in this scheme.